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INTRODUCTION

For over two hundred years our nation's legislatures have, for the most
part, rejected mandatory penalties in favor of judicial discretion to sentence
within a designated range. This policy has endured, despite shifts in
punishment philosophy, for two reasons. First, any offense definition is
necessarily inexact, sweeping in less culpable offenders who just barely violate
its terms along with hardened criminals who cause far more harm than its

drafters envisioned. A sentencing range allows the judge to adjust the sentence
to address these individual cases. Second, as negotiation increasingly
dominates criminal justice, judicial discretion in sentencing has helped to iron
out the very different punishments that like offenders might have otherwise

received as a result of bargains-bargains sometimes based on considerations
that the legislature has not endorsed as valid reasons to reduce or increase
punishment.' The judge's final authority to select an appropriate sentence from
* Lee S. and Charles A. Speir Professor of Law, Vanderbilt University Law School.
My thanks to Jason Criddle for his helpful research assistance.
1. See, e.g., Stephanos Bibas, Plea Bargaining Outside the Shadow of the Trial, 117

HARv. L. REv. 2463, 2474-75 (2004) (explaining that bargaining in federal cases is
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within a range of punishment is thus an essential part of any sentencing policy
that simultaneously values both efficiency through negotiated dispositions and
consistent application of systemwide sentencing norms.2
In the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984,3 Congress recognized that
bargaining threatened to undermine its new sentencing regulations. It also
recognized that judicial oversight was the most potent remedy for this threat.
Continuing the pre-Guidelines practice of real-offense sentencing, the new
Federal Sentencing Guidelines preserved for judges the authority to set final
sentences using offense and offender facts not established as part of the offense
of conviction. 4 But the ability of real-offense sentencing to counter the
sentencing effects of negotiation has proved far from perfect. Both in
bargaining over statutory ranges and in bargaining over sentences within

statutory ranges, parties have easily escaped from the constraints of the
Guidelines.
Prosecutors control statutory ranges by selecting charges. In addition,
prosecutors decide whether to use or forego special sentencing statutes that
carry mandatory minimum penalties higher than the maximum Guidelines
sentence that would otherwise apply to the defendant's conduct, as well as

statutes that authorize a sentence lower than the minimum Guidelines sentence
that would otherwise apply ("safety valve," "substantial assistance," and Rule

35 reductions). 5 By creating these additional provisions and then removing any
effective judicial oversight of their application, Congress has expanded the

sometimes influenced by who wins the race to cooperate, personal attitudes of the

prosecutor, lawyers' skill, friendships and relationships between repeat players, and
workloads); Nancy J. King & Michael E. O'Neill, Appeal Waivers and the Future of
Sentencing Policy, 55 DUKE L.J. (forthcoming 2005) (collecting reports that sentencing

bargains vary depending upon the presence and breadth of appeal waivers, as well as
attorney skill); Ilene H. Nagel & Stephen J. Schulhofer, A Tale of Three Cities: An Empirical
Study of Chargingand BargainingPractices Under the FederalSentencing Guidelines, 66 S.
CAL. L. REV. 501 (1992).
2.

U.S. SENTENCING

COMM'N,

FIFTEEN

YEARS

OF GUIDELINES SENTENCING:

AN

ASSESSMENT OF How WELL THE FEDERAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM IS ACHIEVING THE
GOALS OF SENTENCING REFORM 10 (2004) [hereinafter U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, FIFTEEN-

YEAR REPORT], http://www.ussc.gov/15_year/15year.htm (last visited Aug. 10, 2005).

3. Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1987 (1984) (codified as amended in scattered sections
of 18 and 28 U.S.C.).
4.

U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, FIFTEEN-YEAR REPORT, supra note 2, at 82-84. On real-

offense sentencing generally, see United States v. Booker, 125

S. Ct. 738, 746 (2005)

(Breyer, J.); Julie R. O'Sullivan, In Defense of the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines' Modified

Real-Offense System, 91 Nw. U. L. REv. 1342 (1997); David Yellen, Reforming the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines' Misguided Approach to Real-Offense Sentencing, 58 STAN. L. REv.

267 (2005) (in this Issue).
5. U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, FIFTEEN-YEAR REPORT, supra note 2, at 91 (reporting

that because of a trumping statutory minimum penalty, ten percent of the offenders in 2002
received sentences above the top of the Guidelines range that would otherwise have applied
to their cases and another five percent received sentences in which the Guidelines range was
narrowed).
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opportunities for prosecutors to decide when to opt out of the national
Guidelines and when to abide by them. 6
Other authors in this Issue address whether lawmakers should modify some
of these statutory mechanisms that expand the government's unilateral power to
not-so-different cases. 7 This Article

select very different punishment ranges for
will

focus

instead on the parties' ability to circumvent consistency

by

bargaining around the rules that structure sentences within statutory ranges.
Without careful control by judges, sentencing bargaining carries risks for
structured-sentencing systems that may outweigh gains in efficiency. After a
discussion of weaknesses in the ability of judges to oversee the factual accuracy
of sentencing decisions, this Article advances several options that would
strengthen that supervisory role, promoting greater accuracy, transparency, and
consistency in federal sentencing.

I.

GETTING AROUND THE GUIDELINES

Parties have at least three -mechanisms for evading rules intended to
structure the judge's sentencing decision within a given statutory range,
regardless of whether those rules are the complex Guidelines presently in place,
or are more simplified rules, as several commentators have proposed. First,
because judicial oversight of negotiated sentences depends upon access to

independent offense and offender information in the presentence report, parties
can handicap the judge's ability to detect how their recommended disposition
deviates from the Guidelines by managing the information that is revealed

during the presentence investigation. Second, parties can minimize the impact
of the presentence report by stipulating in their plea agreement to facts or to
applications of factors, hoping the judge will accept their stipulations rather
than take the time to adjudicate the accuracy of those facts or issues. Third,
parties have used plea agreements with binding sentence agreements under
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(c)(1)(C) to bypass judicial oversight of
sentencing entirely. 8
Congress, the Department of Justice, and the Sentencing Commission
recognize that these practices undercut sentencing consistency. The Attorney
6. As the Commission recently observed, when prosecutors use their authority to
bypass sentencing regulations in these ways, "there is little a judge can do to compensate for
the resulting sentencing disparity." Id. at 92.
7. See Douglas A. Berman,. Distinguishing Offense Conduct and Offender
Characteristics in Modern Sentencing Reforms, 58 STAN. L. REv. 277 (2005) (in this Issue);
Nora V. Demleitner, Smart Public Policy: Replacing Imprisonment with Targeted Nonprison
Sentences and Collateral Sanctions, 58 STAN. L. REv. 339 (2005) (in this Issue); Yellen,

supra note 4 (in this Issue).
8. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(c)(1)(C) (providing that an attorney for the government may

"agree that a specific sentence or sentencing range is the appropriate disposition of the case,
or that a particular provision of the Sentencing Guidelines, or policy statement, or sentencing
factor does or does not apply").
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General has advised prosecutors to provide probation officers and judges with
all "readily provable" sentencing facts. 9 The presentence report form itself was
modified to include a section, titled "Impact of the Plea Agreement," to report
the plea's effect on the sentence.1 0 Congress directed the Commission to issue
guidance for judicial policing of plea agreements through Rule 11, hoping that
"judicial review of plea bargaining under such policy statements should
alleviate any potential problem in this area."" In turn, the Commission
promulgated a policy statement that courts "shall" defer deciding whether to
approve charge bargains or plea agreements with binding sentence stipulations
"until there has been an opportunity to consider the [presentence] report."' 2
These rules have yet to produce a unified approach to judicial oversight of
the negotiation of sentences by the parties. Some prosecutors, judges, attorneys,
and probation officers believe justice is served whenever parties choose in their
plea agreements sentences that make sense to them, even if they do not make
sense under the Guidelines, while others disagree. The remainder of this Article
addresses this debate and proposes some modest modifications of present rules.
II. THE EXTENT OF EVASION

There is little research available examining how often information known
to the prosecution or the defense is not included in the presentence report or
investigation or how often parties submit plea agreements that understate
offense or offender information, or how often plea agreements stipulate to
sentences or sentence calculations outside the Guidelines. 13 It is probably safe
to say that stipulations, even when they conflict with factual allegations in the

presentence report, usually reflect appropriate compromise and professional
judgment, not outright manipulation. For example, probation officers (who are

9. See Memorandum from John Ashcroft, Attorney General, Department of Justice, to
All Federal Prosecutors, Regarding Department Policy Concerning Charging Criminal

Offenses, Disposition of Charges, and Sentencing (Sept. 22, 2003) [hereinafter Ashcroft
Memo], http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/2003/September/03_ag_516.htm (last visited Aug. 26,
2005) ("[I]f readily provable facts are relevant to calculations under the Sentencing
Guidelines, the prosecutor must disclose them to the court, including the Probation Office.

Likewise, federal prosecutors may not 'fact bargain,' or be party to any plea agreement that
results in the sentencing court having less than a full understanding of all readily provable
facts relevant to sentencing.").
10. See U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, FIFEEN-YEAR REPORT, supra note 2, at 31 (citing
ADMIN. OFFICE, PUBLICATION No.

107,11-79).

11. S. REP. No. 98-225, at 63 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3246.
12. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 6B1.4 & cmt. (2003). This policy
statement was softened in 2004 to provide that "the court may accept the agreement, reject it,
or defer a decision until the court has reviewed the presentence report." See U.S.
SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 6B 1.4 & cmt. (2004).
13. See, e.g., U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, FIFTEEN-YEAR REPORT, supra note 2, at 82

("The data available to assess these effects are not as detailed and complete as data on the
sentencing decision itself.").
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not lawyers) may not fully understand why the evidence supporting particular
sentencing facts is unreliable or why a judge might accept an argument for
applying a Guidelines factor differently.14
Still, reports of fact and factor management by parties are too frequent to
be ignored. In one survey, more than twenty-five percent of responding judges
reported that stipulations in plea agreements understated the offense conduct
somewhat frequently or very frequently, and another twelve percent said it was

understated about half the time. 15 Another survey revealed that probation
officers in forty-three percent of the districts reported that more often than not,
the calculations in plea agreements were not supported by accurate and
complete offense facts. 16 Other studies, too, have identified fact bargaining. 17
One of the few points on which all nine Justices in Booker could agree was the
persistence of fact bargaining under the Guidelines.18
Evasion may persist in part because existing controls are not effective.

Rules of professional responsibility prohibit misrepresentations by lawyers, but
they do not bar prosecutors from skipping over information when discussing a
case with the probation officer or from closing investigations as soon as a deal
is imminent. Nor do they limit defense attorneys from counseling their clients
not to discuss offense conduct or criminal history with the probation officer, a

common (and understandable) practice in some districts to avoid disclosure of
facts that may lead to an aggravated sentence. 19 Not every prosecutor complies
in every case with the Attorney General's warning to disclose to probation

officers and base plea agreements upon all readily provable facts. And the
primary control-the judge's ability to sort accurate allegations from
questionable ones-is constrained by lack of information and resource

pressures that make testing the reliability of stipulations difficult and costly.
Judges rely on presentence reports for information about the case, but there

14. See, e.g., Felicia Sarner, "Fact Bargaining" Under the Sentencing Guidelines: The
Role of the ProbationDepartment, 8 FED. SENT'G REP. 328 (1996).
15. MOLLY TREADWAY JOHNSON & SCorr A. GILBERT, THE U.S. SENTENCING
GUIDELINES: RESULTS OF THE FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER'S 1996 SURVEY 9-10 & tbl.8 (1997)

[hereinafter FJC REPORT], http://www.fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsf/lookup/gssurvey.pdf/$File/gs
survey.pdf (last visited Aug. 28, 2005).
16. Probation Officers' Survey, 8 FED. SENT'G REP. 303 (1996).
17. U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, FIFTEEN-YEAR REPORT, supra note 2, at 86-88
(collecting authority); see also KATE STITH & JOSE A. CABRANES, FEAR OF JUDGING:
SENTENCING GUIDELINES IN THE FEDERAL COURTS 139 (1998); Joseph S. Hall, Rule
I I(e)(1)(C) and the Sentencing Guidelines: BargainingOutside the Heartland?, 87 IOwA L.
REV. 587, 588, 613 (2002).
18. See United States v. Booker, 125 S. Ct. 738, 762 (2005) (Breyer, J.) (noting that
the "system has not worked perfectly; judges have often simply accepted an agreed-upon
account of the conduct at issue"); id. at 782 (Stevens, J., dissenting, joined by Scalia,
Thomas, and Souter, JJ.) (noting that fact bargaining is "quite common under the current
system").
19. See, e.g., Christopher P. Yates & Louise E. Herrick, The Perils of Discussing
CriminalHistory During the PresentenceInterview, 13 FED. SENT'G REP. 330 (2001).
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are presently few mechanisms in place to ensure that probation officers conduct
thorough investigations. Rather, funding for investigations has not kept pace
with caseloads, and some probation officers reportedly have had to cut corners.
Lacking the time it would take to contact referring state agents, witnesses, and
other sources who could give a more complete picture of the offense, some
officers make do with the prosecution's description.20 Investigations of the
defendant and his circumstances are also abbreviated compared to those of the
past. Some officers reportedly avoid investigating facts once they learn there is
a stipulation, particularly if there is an appeal waiver.2 1

Delayed consideration of presentence reports can cripple oversight as well.
Judges often accept plea agreements including stipulations as to sentencing
facts and factors before reviewing the presentence report. If later a conflict
arises between the stipulated recommendations and the presentence report,
theoretically the judge can reject the stipulations and impose a sentence based
on the facts as established at the hearing, but reportedly judges infrequently
choose to do so.23 One probation officer said in responding to an informal
20.

STITH & CABRANES,

supra note 17, at 129;

U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, FIFTEEN-

YEAR REPORT, supra note 2, at 84; see also Probation Officers' Survey, supra note 16
(reporting that the offense conduct section of the presentence report is prepared either by the
prosecutor or by the probation officer based almost entirely on government submissions);

Marcia G. Shein & Cloud H. Miller, III, A "Knowing, Intelligent and Voluntary" Plea: The
Justice Department'sLatest Oxymoron, 19 CHAMPION 10, 13 (1995) (noting that resource
constraints force probation officers to limit their investigation to the prosecutor's version).
21. King & O'Neill, supra note 1, at n.85. Quoting a defender:
About the same time appeal waivers came in, that's when probation said we're accepting the

stipulations. Except really obvious stuff, like if my guy shot somebody, he can't claim he
didn't have a gun. So this is important in considering appeal waivers, because we're going
into it knowing that the Probation Office will not upset stipulations.

Id.
22. See In re Ellis, 356 F.3d 1198 (9th Cir. 2004) (collecting authority).
23. FJC REPORT, supra note 15, at 9-10 (noting that judges infrequently examined
underlying conduct behind agreements); U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, FIFTEEN-YEAR REPORT,

supra note 2, at 86 (collecting research that found that in "a significant number of districts,
probation officers reported that the court would usually or nearly always defer to the plea
agreement when it conflicted with information in the presentence report" and that revealed

that a significant percentage of judges and probation officers reported that stipulations as to
sentencing in plea agreements understated offense conduct); Leslie A. Cory, Looking at the
Federal Sentencing Process One Judge at a Time, One Probation Officer at a Time, 51

EMORY L.J. 379, 396-97 (2002) ("A presentence report that conflicts with the representations
of a plea agreement may be welcomed by a judge who wants to maintain control of the

process, but considered a nuisance by a judge who prefers to rely on the prosecution and
defense to work out the sentence."); Kate Stith & Josh A. Cabranes, Judging Under the
Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 91 Nw. U. L. REv. 1247, 1262 (1997) (reporting that
"federal judges increasingly reject the probation officer's Guidelines calculations in favor of
a sentence or sentencing range that the parties jointly recommend as part of a plea bargain,"
that "some judges have directed probation officers to limit their investigations to the facts as
stipulated by the parties," and that "others have viewed a sentencing agreement between the
parties as a legitimate alternative to the sentencing outcome that would likely be calculated
under the Guidelines in the absence of the agreement"); see also United States v. Granik,
386 F.3d 404, 413 (2d Cir. 2004) ("[F]acts admitted in a plea agreement can, and usually
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survey on post-Booker practice: "There is disparity, especially when there is a
stipulated sentence and the courts know there will not be an appeal. It's
disconcerting because it is as varied as the tenacity of the advocate." 24
Binding sentence agreements are even more impervious to contradiction
later at sentencing by a presentence report. Binding sentence agreements are
sometimes referred to as "C" pleas-plea agreements authorized under
subsection (C) of Rule 11(c)(1). A plea agreement under subsection (B)
involves mere recommendations as to sentence, so that the defendant enters a
guilty plea risking that the judge may impose a sentence higher than the
sentence recommended in the agreement. Agreements under subsection (C)
provide more certainty to the parties regarding the sentence once the plea is
accepted. If later at sentencing the judge decides based on the presentence
report that the sentencing stipulations in an agreement under subsection (C) are
inappropriate, the judge cannot impose a higher sentence but must allow the
defendant to withdraw the plea. Before Booker, some courts had interpreted
subsection (C) to authorize judges to accept sentences outside the Guidelines
when the parties so stipulated. Now that Booker has loosened the grip of the
Guidelines, it is even less likely that a judge confronted with a contradiction
will, be accepted by the sentencing court as true.").
24. E-mail from Colleen Rahill-Beuler to Author (May 23, 2005) (on file with author)
(summarizing survey responses to be reported as part of panel discussion at the National
Sentencing Institute on May 26, 2005); see also David N. Adair, Jr. & Toby D. Slawsky,
Looking at the Law, Fact-finding in Sentencing, FED. PROBATION, Dec. 1991, at 67 ("The
practice of permitting the parties to stipulate to facts, without close review by the court to
determine the accuracy of the stipulation, undermines the purposes of sentencing reform.
Inaccurate facts, no matter how they are determined, lead to inaccurate guideline ranges and
inappropriate sentences.").

25. In 1999, Rule

11 was amended to expand "C" plea agreements to allow not only

designated specific sentences, but also specified sentencing factors, ranges, or offense levels.
A split of authority developed over whether this change authorized judges to endorse a
sentence outside the Guidelines whenever the parties agreed. See Stephanos Bibas, The
Feeney Amendment and the Continuing Rise of ProsecutorialPower To Plea Bargain, 94 J.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 295 (2004) (collecting authority); see also United States v. Heard,

359 F.3d 544 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (holding that a "C" plea capped what would have been a 188month sentence at 48 months); John M. Dick, Allowing Sentence Bargains To Fall Outside
of the Guidelines Without Valid Departures: It Is Time for the Commission To Act, 48
HASTINGS L.J. 1017, 1049 (1997). My own view is that the amendment was not intended to
license Guidelines-free sentencing. The text of the Rule allows stipulations as to whether a
factor is or is not applicable." FED. R. CRIM. P.
"provision, policy statement or ...
11(c)(1)(C). It does not allow the parties to edit or discard the Guidelines at their
convenience. Instead, the amendment does two things. First, it permits the parties to agree on
the specific sentence or scoring that a lawful interpretation of the Guidelines would produce.
Second, it clarifies that a defendant can withdraw a plea entered under subsection (C) if the
agreement is rejected at sentencing, but that a defendant cannot withdraw a plea entered
under subsections (A) or (B) of the Rule if the sentence differs from the agreement. The
Advisory Committee specifically declined to address the issue whether, in a case where the

parties agreed in a "C" plea to a sentence unauthorized by the Guidelines, a judge has the
authority to impose the sentence as well as the authority to reject the plea. See FED. R.
P. 11 (advisory committee's notes on 1999 amendments).

CRIM.
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between the parties' stipulated sentence and a Guidelines-compliant sentence
that is higher will force the defendant to either accept the higher sentence or
withdraw the guilty plea.26 And "C" pleas, which used to be quite unusual,
seem to be growing in popularity.2 7
III. THE COSTS OF FACILITATING EVASION BY AGREEMENT

Assuming that Guidelines evasion goes undiscovered (or uncorrected) by
judges in some segment of cases, the question for policymakers is whether it is
worth the effort to try to limit it further. On balance, I believe that some
additional incremental controls are warranted. At the very least, lawmakers
should consider these issues carefully before encouraging even greater judicial
deference to sentence bargaining.28
A non-Guidelines sentence is not "reasonable" just because the parties
agree to it. After Booker, supporters of negotiated sentences might claim that
any stipulated sentence within the statutory range is "reasonable." Neither the
text of the Sentencing Reform Act nor the Court's decision in Booker supports
this claim. Booker requires that judges impose sentences that are "reasonable,"
but only after consideration of the Guidelines. A judge is not free to ignore the
Guidelines just because the parties decide that they would like her to do so, and
sentencing policy should be structured accordingly.
Transparency makes sentencing policy better, not worse. A few judges and

26. U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, FIFTEEN-YEAR REPORT, supra note 2, at 144
("Rejection of plea agreements that undermine the guidelines, though not unknown, appears
to have been relatively rare .... ") (citing Adair & Slawsky, supra note 24); see also Caryl
A. Ricca, Simplification of Chapter Four: Comments from the Probation Officers Advisory
Group to the U.S. Sentencing Commission, 9 FED. SENT'G REP. 209, 211 (1997) ("Whatever

the reason, probation officers frequently come up with a different criminal history category
than the parties. Theoretically, this should undermine a Rule 1 (e)(1)(C) plea agreement or a

plea agreement stipulating to a § 5K1.1 departure for substantial assistance to the
government. However, all too often, the stipulated sentence is not adjusted to take into
consideration the probation officer's more accurate summary of the criminal history. . . . [I]n
too many cases, if the government does not like the result, the numbers are fudged to match
the recommended sentence in the plea agreement.").

27. Possibly judges are willing to provide more certainty to defendants who are
waiving their rights to appeal sentencing error. See King & O'Neill, supra note 1 (noting a
substantial proportion of plea agreements involved binding sentence agreements); see also

Rahill-Bueler E-mail, supra note 24 (noting report from at least one district of "more use of
stipulations that are binding, in which case we do the guidelines calculations based on that
and if we find a difference, note it in the Impact of Plea Agreement").
28. An additional argument raised in favor of encouraging negotiated sentences is that
a settlement provides more finality for victims than the uncertainty of judicial determination
that may differ from the preferences of the parties. Victims, however, would probably prefer
that defendants be sentenced by a judge who is fully informed about mitigating and
aggravating circumstances, even if it takes a bit longer to obtain a final sentence. Moreover,
victim participation in sentencing is also much more likely when a sentence does not become

a done deal at the plea stage.
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commentators have argued that judges should tolerate, or even encourage,
negotiated sentences outside the Guidelines as more appropriate (i.e., less
severe) than the sentences called for by the application of the Guidelines to the
facts as presented in the presentence report. 9 Accepting a stipulation is more
efficient than the process of making accurate findings and then explaining why
the defendant should receive a sentence outside the Guidelines. It is also less
visible.30 Unlike a departure, a stipulated sentence will not be appealed.
Moreover, because legislative adjustments to federal sentencing policy have

been a one-way ratchet for twenty years, 3 1 the prospect of provoking yet
another round of even tougher sentencing rules makes the transparency of overt
departures considerably less attractive to the judge or prosecutor who views a
Guidelines sentence as too long already, and real-offense sentencing as already
far too "real."
As a reason to weaken or discourage judicial scrutiny of sentence
agreements, however, this argument is not appealing to anyone who respects

the conscientious efforts of the legislature and the judiciary to pursue the
nation's criminal justice goals. Sentencing law should be informed by the
candid views of all judges and attorneys. Most judges and prosecutors after
Booker are carefully applying the Guidelines and dutifully explaining the
reasons why each sentence is appropriate. If there are some who are not,
sentencing policy should not encourage their game of hide and seek.32 Several
authors in this Issue urge Congress to take more care in separating good

disparities from bad ones. 33 The best hope for accomplishing this goal is not to
make it even easier for judges to settle for whatever sentence the parties
propose. Instead, sentencing policy should make it easier for judges to look

behind stipulations so that every sentence is based on accurate information, and
29. See, e.g., Stith & Cabranes, supra note 23, at 1265.
30. See, e.g., Eugene D. Natali, The Probation Officer, Bean Counting and Truth in
Sentencing, 4 FED. SENT'G REP. 102, 106 (1991) (noting that by stipulating to agree on the
facts, parties can "sponsor de facto departures from the guidelines without uttering the
dreaded 'D' word").
31. U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, FIFTEEN-YEAR REPORT, supra note 2, at 138 (noting the
"steady accretion of guideline enhancements," that "Congress frequently has directed the
Commission to add aggravating adjustments to a wide variety of guidelines," and that
"[p]olitical pressure to respond to public concerns over high-publicity crimes could result in
frequent revision of the guidelines without a sound policy basis").
32. Professor Berman once said that fact bargaining "is less likely the consequence of
miscreant prosecutors who seek to thwart a just sentencing system, and more likely the
consequence of lawabiding attorneys seeking to achieve just results in a sentencing system
that no longer allows them to accomplish those ends directly." Douglas Berman, Is Fact
Bargaining Undermining the Sentencing Guidelines?, 8 FED. SENT'G REP. 300, 305 (1996).
After Booker, the system allows direct advocacy by all for non-Guidelines sentences,
obviating the need for subterfuge through unexamined or questionable factual stipulations.
33. See Albert W. Alschuler, Disparity: The Normative and Empirical Failure of the
Federal Guidelines, 58 STAN. L. REv. 85 (2005) (in this Issue); Margareth Etienne, Parity,
Disparity, and Adversariality: First Principles of Sentencing, 58 STAN. L. REv. 309 (2005)
(in this Issue).
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it should encourage judges to explain fully their reasons for selecting the
sentences that they do.
The gains in efficiency are not worth the cost. Judicial oversight of
sentence bargaining is crucial to preserve national sentencing policy, even
though deferring to parties would save time and money. The most efficient
resolution is not necessarily the most fair. This principle was not lost on either
Congress or the Commission, who provided in Rule 32 for a presentence
investigation in every case (not just when the parties wanted one), and provided

that factual ambiguities should be disclosed for judicial resolution (not
bargained away). 34 In particular, a policy of encouraging non-Guidelines
sentences when preferred by the parties while discouraging the same when
selected by judges means that the Guidelines are applied only when the

prosecutor chooses to apply them.3 5 When negotiated sentencing replaces
sentencing by judges, the reasons why some defendants and some crimes are
exempted from Guidelines' applications can no longer be reviewed. Congress
might approve some of the reasons prosecutors make sentence bargains (e.g.,
proof problems or victim preference), but it would probably reject others (e.g.,
a defendant's refusal to agree to an appeal waiver or an individual prosecutor's

disagreement with a Guidelines' weighting). 36 As the former Attorney General
has observed, a sentence should no more turn on which prosecutor the
defendant draws than which judge the defendant draws. 37
It is worth noting one specific risk of delegating sentencing to
adversaries-unregulated bargaining can lead to deeper and deeper discounts
for waiving process. Prosecutors can offer sentencing discounts only to
defendants who stipulate to sentencing facts and can withhold them from
defendants who insist on their rights under Rule 32. If settling rather than
adjudicating sentencing facts becomes the norm, then the defendant who
litigates will never get the "stipulating" discount. Punishment, which is

supposed to be allocated depending upon the factors included in the Sentencing
Reform Act and the Guidelines, will be allocated instead in accordance with the
priorities of local prosecutors. Already, prison time is the currency used to

34. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(c)(1)(A) (requiring investigation unless statute requires
otherwise or court explains on the record why presentence report is not needed for it to
"meaningfully exercise its sentencing authority under 18 U.S.C. § 3553"); U.S. SENTENCING
GUIDELINES MANUAL § 6B1.4(b) & cmt. (2004) ("The stipulation should identify all areas of
agreement, disagreement and uncertainty that may be relevant to the determination of
sentence.") (emphasis added).
35. See, e.g., Stephen J. Schulhofer & Ilene H. Nagel, Negotiated Pleas Under the
Federal Sentencing Guidelines: The First Fifteen Months, 27 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 231, 287

(1989).
36. U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, FIFTEEN-YEAR REPORT, supra note 2, at 137; see also
Schulhofer & Nagel, supra note 35, at 263 (arguing that factor bargaining "thwart[s] the
underlying logic of the Guidelines and their goals of proportionality, uniformity and reduced
disparity").
37. Ashcroft Memo, supra note 9, at 2.
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purchase a defendant's agreement to waive sentencing hearings and the right to
appeal sentencing error, functioning as a discount for waiving sentencing
regulation itself. Without judicial oversight, not only is the discount for
waiving sentencing regulation likely to get deeper, it is also likely to vary
significantly from district to district and from case to case.
In a time when the judiciary is experiencing acute financial crisis, 3 9 it is
understandable that policy might flow in the direction of reducing costs. But
policymakers should keep in mind that encouraging sentence negotiation is not
a costless strategy for any structured sentencing system such as the Guidelines.
The less scrutiny judges give to criminal settlements, the less overall
compliance there will be with national sentencing regulation.
Regulating bargained sentences is not a futile enterprise. The

final

justification for encouraging a hands-off approach to negotiated sentences is the
practical objection that regulating sentencing bargaining is a wasted effort.
Some judges have pointed out that even if probation officers consistently
present the full story at sentencing, the evidence available at the sentencing

hearing may be insufficient to prove the allegations in the report that conflict
with the stipulations of the parties. Establishing facts in an adversarial system
without the assistance of adversaries is an awkward business.4 0 The judge
cannot force a prosecutor or a defendant to present evidence that she chooses
not to advance. Probation officers may fail to marshal the evidence needed for
the hearing if the burden of establishing facts falls upon them. 4 1
This argument raises a fascinating feature of sentencing law in a world of

38. See, e.g., King & O'Neill, supra note 1 (reporting the practice of exchanging
enhancements and discounts for waivers of appeal).
39. See WILLIAM REHNQUIST, 2004 YEAR-END REPORT ON THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY,
http://www.supremecourtus.gov/publicinfo/year-end/2004year-endreport.pdf
(last visited
Aug. 26, 2005) (referring to the "funding crisis currently affecting the federal Judiciary").
40. John Gleeson, Sentence BargainingUnder the Guidelines, 8 FED. SENT'G REP. 314,
317 (1996) ("The court may be pursuing the 'true' facts, but neither side really wants it to
succeed. This is not the sort of inquiry for which courts are well-equipped, and should only
be conducted if the court concludes that the adversarial process has gone seriously awry. A
compromise of a few levels on the guidelines chart is not such a situation.").
41. Judge Saris relates two examples:
I recently had a bank fraud case where the parties agreed that the dollar loss figure was one
level lower than the amount the victim bank had informed the probation officer. The
probation officer merely had the figures provided by the bank, without self-explanatory back
up documentation, and had not subpoenaed the bank employee to the hearing. I accepted the
plea agreement because I did not find the record supported the higher level by a
preponderance of the evidence.... In another sentencing hearing on the amount of economic
loss from a mail fraud scheme, several victims of the scheme claimed they should be
considered for purposes of reluctant conduct and restitution. Although the government agreed
not to assert their claims in the plea agreement, the probation officer concluded their claims
were credible in the PSR [presentence report]. For want of a better procedure, I ended up
conducting the direct examination with the defense counsel doing the cross. This approach
was equally awkward.

Patti B. Saris, Below the Radar Screens: Have the Sentencing Guidelines Eliminated
Disparity?One Judge's Perspective, 30 SUFFOLK U. L. REv. 1027, 1060 (1997).
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negotiated punishment-that is, its curious balance of adversarial and
inquisitorial procedure. Judges are responsible for resolving disputes not only
between the two parties but also between the parties and the probation officer,
who is a judicial officer. Judges must police settlements, not simply facilitate
them, but must do so without participating directly in negotiations. The proper
response to these unusual demands is not for judges to throw up their hands and
let the parties have their way. Instead, sentencing policy should encourage
judges to fulfill their unique responsibilities in overseeing agreements in
criminal cases and to provide them with alternatives and options. For example,
if the probation officer alleges facts in the presentence report that conflict with
the representations in the plea agreement, the judge could require that the
officer include with his report any supporting evidence he has for those facts in
order to assist the judge in determining whether each fact has been established
by at least a preponderance of the evidence.
Finally, in response to the argument that prosecutors will always have
access to other forms of subterfuge to reach the same results no matter what the
judge does,42 I agree with Professor O'Sullivan, "To acknowledge that not all
disparities flowing from executive decisionmaking can effectively be controlled
does not ... compel the conclusion that no effort should be made to eliminate
some of those disparities."4 3
IV. SOME OPTIONS FOR IMPROVING JUDICIAL OVERSIGHT OF NEGOTIATED
SENTENCES

The most important step in improving judicial oversight of negotiated
sentences is to increase the utility of presentence reports. Three concrete
changes would help make presentence reports more accurate and useful.
First, ensuring adequate funding for thorough presentence investigations is
essential. Burdensome caseloads can lead probation officers to become too
dependent upon what prosecutors tell them, foregoing the effort to obtain
additional information from victims, witnesses, agents, or defense counsel, or
even to inspect the prosecution's file. Judges are powerless to monitor the
accuracy of factual allegations by the parties if probation officers receive only
the information that the prosecution chooses to reveal.44 Routing more
42. Cf Gleeson, supra note 40, at 315 ("If a prosecutor can compromise the
remorselessly rigid guidelines in exchange for cooperation, why can't she do so in exchange
for the certainty of conviction in a shaky case, or as part of a policy designed to loosen a
logjam of cases?"); Hall, supra note 17, at 614 ("[S]trict rules requiring slavish adherence to

the Guidelines would most likely have the effect of forcing prosecutors and defendants to
disguise Guideline manipulation .... ").
43. O'Sullivan, supra note 4, at 1407.

44. As Professor Richman recently stated, judges should encourage probation officers
to talk to case agents directly. If higher sentences are the result, "the solution here ought to
be rules ensuring that [a defendant] can withdraw his plea" and that judges can adjust the
sentence, "not [rules] that silence agencies." Daniel Richman, Prosecutors and Their Agents,
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resources into presentence investigations is difficult to manage in a period of
fiscal crisis. 45 Yet, as difficult as funding decisions are, those who make them
should not overlook the relationship between presentence reports and
sentencing consistency. The more difficult it becomes for probation officers to
seek independent sources of information, the less tenable it becomes for judges
to oversee sentencing decisions made by the parties.
Second, minimum standards for presentence investigations would also help
to preserve consistency in sentencing. Particularly now, after Booker, when the

probation officer's job arguably has shifted to a more exploratory investigation
for factors relevant to section 3553(a),46 judges together with the Commission
should continue to monitor current presentence investigation practices and
consider minimum standards for not only the form these reports take but also
for the investigation itself. 47 Sentencing policy that relies so heavily on
presentence investigations should include nationwide norms for those
investigations.

Third, preplea review of sentencing information should be routine when
plea agreements contain sentencing stipulations. Presently, judges need not
review presentence reports before accepting or rejecting plea agreements that

contain stipulations as to the sentence. Allowing parties to have the last say
over sentences and Guidelines calculations without judicial review of the
presentence report is bad policy. If parties seek acceptance of a plea agreement
that contains stipulations that affect sentencing, they should not also have the
option of delaying the presentence investigation until after those stipulations

are accepted. 49 This "hide the ball" technique does not advance the goals of the
Agents and Their Prosecutors, 103 COLUM. L. REv. 749, 829 (2003).
45. See, e.g., ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, 2004 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE
DIRECTOR ("The challenge is to provide high quality investigative and supervision services

to the Judiciary despite projected increases in workload and the likelihood that the workforce
will not grow to keep up."), http://www.uscourts.gov/library/annual_probation.htm (last
visited Aug. 26, 2005); U.S. JUDICIAL CONFERENCE, REPORT OF THE MEETING OF THE
JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES 14 (2004) ("[r]ecognizing the seriousness of
the judiciary's financial situation" and recommending "revisions to certain practices with
respect to . . . presentence investigation reports . . . to reduce specific categories of work
currently being performed but not absolutely critical to public safety and the mission of
probation and pretrial services"), http://www.uscourts.gov/judconf/sep04proc.pdf (last
visited Aug. 10, 2005).
46. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2005) (outlining the factors to consider when sentencing).

47. Guidelines for ensuring that victim information about restitution reaches the judge
have already been prepared for internal use by the Department of Justice. See OFFICE FOR
VICTIMS OF CRIMES, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, ATTORNEY GENERAL GUIDELINES FOR VICTIM

AND WITNESS ASSISTANCE (2005), http://www.usdoj.gov/olp/final.pdf (last visited Aug. 26,

2005).
48. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 6B1.1(c) (2004) ("To the extent the
plea agreement is of the type specified in Rule I 1(c)(1)(A) or (C), the court may accept the
agreement, reject it, or defer a decision until the court has reviewed the presentence report.").
49. Adair & Slawsky, supra note 24, at 67 ("Courts can aid in the sentencing process
by . . . not accepting pleas until the presentence report is reviewed and the court is assured
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Sentencing Reform Act. 50
One possible improvement would be to amend Rule 11 to require the judge
to review the presentence report before accepting any "C" plea agreement,
making the parties' access to a "C" plea contingent upon judicial review of the
presentence report.51 Alternatively, an abbreviated investigation could be
required for those specific aspects of the sentence that the parties would like to
tie down. For example, often the information available at the time of the plea to
the parties about a defendant's criminal history is sketchy or incomplete.
Before the judge is asked to accept a plea agreement that contains a stipulation
about criminal history, the probation officer could prepare the criminal history
section of the presentence report for the judge (and the parties) to review. 52
Two additional changes would assist in promoting informed oversight of
negotiated sentences in the long term. One positive step would be for the
Commission to improve its data collection concerning the effects of negotiation
on sentencing. 53 In order to anticipate when negotiated sentences may be

crowding out adjudicated sentences and to promote more informed sentencing
policy, the Commission should add two items to the data collected from each
case: first, whether the case involved a "C" plea, and second, whether the
presentence report was reviewed by the judge before accepting the plea

agreement. Despite the promise of the Commission to collect data on plea
practices and to determine whether those practices are undermining the intent
of the Sentencing Reform Act, 54 the Commission has never collected this basic
information. As a result, although some report more stipulations and "C" pleas
since Booker, no one really knows how often these sorts of agreements are used
today.5 5
that the plea will not undermine the guidelines.").
50. See also Shein & Miller, supra note 20, at 10-11 (arguing that preparation of the

presentence report during plea negotiations and prior to the formal acceptance of the plea
would give notice to a defendant about sentencing before entering a plea agreement-an
understanding that defendants too often lack).

51. See Bibas, supra note 25, at 306 n.63.
52. See Daniel W. Stiller, Chapter FourSurprises and a Defender's Longest Drive, 13
FED. SENT'G REP. 323 (2001).
53. The need for better collection and dissemination of sentencing information

generally is discussed elsewhere in this Issue. See Marc L. Miller & Ronald F. Wright, "The
Wisdom We Have Lost": Sentencing Information and Its Uses, 58 STAN. L. REv. 361 (2005)
(in this Issue).
54. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL, ch. 1, pt. A, introductory cmt. (2004).

55. There are good reasons to anticipate that stipulations and "C" pleas have increased
in popularity and will continue to do so, even under an advisory Guidelines system. The

historical objection to binding sentence agreements was that they usurped judicial power, but
newer judges accustomed to much more limited sentencing authority under the Guidelines

system may feel less keenly the loss of sentencing authority that a "C" plea may carry.
Alternatively, the reluctance of government attorneys to provide "C" pleas in the pre-Booker
environment may have been related to the assurance that should the judge decide based on
the presentence report to impose a sentence different from the negotiated sentence, the
change would have been in the government's favor. After Booker, that prediction is no
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Finally, courts and probation officers should work toward ways to
standardize the collection and use of information from victims. Victims provide
another independent source of sentencing information in some cases. Presently,
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32 provides that victim-impact statements
must be included in presentence reports, and victims of certain crimes must be
given the opportunity to speak if present at sentencing. 56 The Department of
Justice has encouraged individual victim-witness coordinators to improve
victim participation through victim-impact statements. 57 But judges will often
accept plea agreements, even those that include provisions that affect
sentencing (including restitution), without any input from the victim, well

before the victim-impact statement has been prepared. The new Justice for All
Act grants victims the "right to be reasonably heard at any public proceeding in

the district court involving release, plea, [or] sentencing, ... [t]he reasonable
right to confer with the attorney for the Government in the case,... [and the]
right to full and timely restitution as provided in law."58 In the next several
years the courts will determine what this statutory language requires in practice,

but it undoubtedly means more victim participation in sentencing than is
provided under the current version of Rule 32.59 The Act presents an
unprecedented opportunity to establish nationwide norms for incorporating
victim information into the sentencing process.
A victim's participation in sentencing can be particularly useful during the
presentence investigation and in the adjudication of sentencing facts, as an
independent source of information about the offense or offender that may
counter the script the parties have negotiated in the plea agreement. The
influence of sentencing recommendations by victims, however, should be

carefully limited so as not to undermine the goal of consistency that was, and

longer as reliable, at least for some judges. Stipulations and "C" pleas will help to increase
predictability as judges' sentencing practices under an advisory Guidelines regime remain

unknown. Also, judges may be sympathetic to the risks facing defendants whenever appeal
waivers are included in the plea agreement. Rather than reject appeal waivers, judges may

prefer to provide the defendant the certainty that a "C" plea can offer. Finally, although the
scope of the rule in Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000), remains a moving target,

it is highly unlikely to be extended by the Court in a manner that threatens the finality of
facts expressly admitted in a written plea agreement.
56. Victim and Witness Protection Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-291, 96 Stat. 1248,
1249 (amending FED. R. CRIM. P. 32). For an early description of victim participation in
federal sentencing, see Robert C. Wells, Considering Victim Impact-The Role of Probation,
FED. PROBATION,

Sept. 1990, at 26-29.

57. See OFFICE FOR VICTIMS OF CRIMES, supra note 47, at 32-33.

58. 18 U.S.C. § 3771(a)(4) (2005).
59. Judge Paul Cassell has already argued that in order to accommodate the new
Justice for All Act, the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure should be amended to require
the prosecutor to confer with the victim about the plea, inform the court if the victim objects,
and disclose at least portions of the presentence report to the victim. See Judge Paul G.
Cassell, Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure in Light of the
Crime Victims Rights Act (Mar. 2, 2005) (draft on file with author).

308

STANFORD LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 58:293

still is, at the heart of the Sentencing Reform Act.6 0
CONCLUSION

Those who craft sentencing policy should continue to be concerned about
how bargains affect sentencing for one simple reason: parties do not strike
deals that maximize sentencing consistency. They have entirely different goals.
Every settlement is a complex accommodation of cooperation opportunities,
strength of evidence, available litigation resources, witness credibility, the
going price for appeal waivers, attorney skill and tenacity, local custom, and
countless other factors, some of which have never been approved as legitimate
reasons to allocate punishment, either by Congress or by the Commission.
Oversight of negotiated sentences by judges provides some assurance that
bargains do not deviate too far, or too often, from legislated limits on
punishment.

60. A useful collection of materials on victim participation appears in 1999 UTAH L.
REv. 331-552. See also Edna Erez, Victim Participationin Sentencing: And the Debate Goes
On... , 3 INT'L REV. VICTIMOLOGY 17 (1994); Donald J. Hall, Victims' Voices in Criminal
Court: The Need for Restraint, 28 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 233, 241-46 (1991).

